teach Latin and catechism in addition to music and deal with a motely of forces typical of a booming mercantile city, a laboratory for an emerging self-conscious bourgeoisie-was not a happy one. The position, he later ruefully remarked, was "described to me in such favorable terms that finally… I made the change of position." 3 Bach took the job soberly and cheerlessly, having fallen from grace with his erstwhile patron, the young and merry prince Leopold von Anhalt-Köthen, whom he served as Kapellmeister, upon the princely marriage to a princess who "seemed to be unmusical [amusa] ." 4 He was also driven by concerns of providing an adequate education for his four sons, as well as his wish to concentrate on liturgical music, for which there was not much demand-nor the means of performance-in tiny AnhaltKöthen. Nevertheless, he felt driven away from a place where, he wrote to a friend, "I intended to spend the rest of my life." 5 Bach moved from country to city, from associating with carefree, capricious and benevolent landed gentry to navigating the power structures of his new urban employers-a city council of shrewd and exigent merchants, seasoned bureaucrats and well-to-do artisans, determined to get good value in return for every Thaler they spent on city services. Having had to audition for the job and pass an exam in Lutheran theology, he got it after the city council failed to secure the services of his famous contemporary Telemann (who asked for too much money) and of the runnerup, one Graupner. 6 Bach, a Kapellmeister to a rural aristocracy, moved on to become cantor to the Saxon urban bourgeoisie. He left the pre-modern feudal structure of a 3 Letter to Georg Erdmann, NBR 152. 4 Ibid. In fact -which is sometimes overlooked -Bach was not, ultimately, obliged to leave Anhalt-Köten. Four days before he left the princely winds changed and he was offered to remain there after all. By then preparations were made, inertia was set and the Bach family moved on. The princess, who dies soon thereafter, in fact did keep musical notes among her personal belongings. She liked military things and Bach's introspective work may simply not have been much to her taste. 5 Ibid.
tiny 1700s court for a devout, materialistic, new-money city ecstatic with the sense of its own progress and modernization (Leipzig enjoyed underground sewage and streetlamps and hosted the most important commercial fair in Germany; it also boasted of the leading law school of the land).
Not less significant-although generally ignored by scholarship-was the matter of Bach's legal status. Up to this point in his career, Bach always served as a statusdetermined servant within a feudal hierarchy. 7 This status restricted, or at least challenged, mobility: earlier in his career, when attempting to leave Weimar and the service of a local duke, his seigniorial lord expressed his displeasure by having Bach incarcerated for almost a month for "stubbornly forcing the issue of his dismissal." 8
In Anhalt-Köthen, too, Bach served at his master's pleasure, complying with a centuries-old aristocratic order. In Leipzig all that changed. For the first significant time in his career, Bach signed a contract of employment; no longer a servant, he became an employee.
By becoming a contractual employee, Bach has formally moved along what has become one of legal theory's most celebrated (and contested) theses: Henry Maine's characterization of modernity as a gradual shift "from status to contract." 9 In a way, Bach may seem to embody Maine's dictum, but also the mirage of personal autonomy and empowerment that the new language of contract pretended to entail.
Indeed, from legal and civic points of view, Bach has left behind one Europe and joined another. His professional life then turned much to the worse, for a decade at least. While the language and ideology of freedom of contract already informed his new legal position, edging back the set ways of feudal societies, contract as a legal institution was not yet backed by commensurable social structures nor by the moral 7 With one brief exception: earlier in his career, Bach served as organist for the imperial free city of Mühlhausen. He was 22 at the time and quit after nine months. It was in Mühlhausen that he wrote his first cantata (BWV 71), the only one published in his lifetime. The cantata's title page is a fascinating document: glorifying the councilmen who commissioned it in boldface, it features Bach's name, in much smaller typeset, at the very bottom (NBR 27 implications that contract presumed to express. I return to this point below, after a brief discussion of Maine's thesis and the emerging philosophy of contract and sociology of the rising bourgeois order that it sought to capture. This is the context in which I want to explore Bach's travails as a case study of early modernity's emerging category of "private" law. Reading Bach's letters from that period, I argue that they express (whether consciously or not is another matter) the specifically contractual nature of his position. When things went bad, Bach began to "talk contract;" so did the city council. This interpretation is based on a close reading of some of his texts that manifests a legal conceptualization of his claims against the Leipzig city council, detailed below.
For modernists and postmodernists alike, Maine's account, according to which "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been movement from status to contract," 10 has become a benchmark for discussing the jurisprudential transformations of modernity, in particular those preceding the industrial revolution. If a little crude, Maine offers more than an empirical claim: it is an interpretative and rationalizing one, according to which the main organizational principal governing Western societies has shifted, from the pre-modern, feudal modality of comprehensive status to the modern modality of contractual obligation, nested in individuals and corporations who transact and form relations of exchange voluntarily with minimal state intervention (hence "private" law). Contract stimulated the fragmentation of social roles, supported social mobility and -coupled with enhanced legal protections of private property and global mercantilismsupplied the emerging relations of production of bourgeois and capitalist societies with a sophisticated normative framework. 11 Maine's deterministic outlook is entirely 19 th century, expressing in hindsight the rise of the ideology of individualism, subjectivity and agency of classical liberalism, contemporary urbanization processes and the rise of a public sphere that it served. For whereas feudal status is comprehensive in its reach and effects, and is significantly determined as a matter of luck -being granted or thrust on a person -contract expresses the categories of 10 Ibid. voluntarism, choice, and action. This should not be read as a dichotomy; but as social modalities, Maine has offered a strong interpretative distinction. This, of course, does not mean that contract was not an important social principle in premodernity, or that status or other non-contractual forms ceased to play a significant role in social organization later on. 12 What cannot be denied, however, is that as products of the enlightenment, contract as a legal form and classical liberalism as a political model presupposing a theory of human nature, fit each other like glove to hand. Contract was a social principle on which both deontologists and utilitarians could agree: the former basing contract on the obligation to perform on promises in the "kingdom of ends;" the latter, on the belief in exchange propelled by private preferences and the social welfare-generating promise of Adam Smith's "invisible hand." With liberalism, contract became the main metaphor for politics ("social contract" in Hobbes, Rousseau and later Locke, all the way down -or up -to Habermas and Rawls), as well as the pertinent expression, in the social sphere, of the autonomy of the self and the rising principle of the will, so forcefully advanced by Kant. 13 Yet calling some legal relation "contract" does not, by itself, imply the actual presence of any of these values. According to Maine's status-to contract axis, Bach appears to have moved on ahead: in Leipzig, where he remained for twenty seven years and wrote the bulk of his most important music (some of which was lost), he entered the most significant contractual relation of his life. Yet he would have proved 12 Indeed, as classical contract gradually made way for other forms of regulation in capitalistic societies (as the title of Atiyah's monumental book catches and indeed exaggerates), critical works show status to be prevalent, or re-relevant, as contract has mutated into new forms of regulating relations both in the public and private spheres in industrial and postindustrial societies. 13 However, according to Gordley, contract as a main principle of social control owes much more to scholastic theories of natural law than to the rising of utilitarian liberalism. My claim, to clarify, is not causal: liberalism may have found in contract an almost-perfect complement technology, even if the emergence of the latter was ideologically and intellectually independent. This is of course not the place to discuss these claims in detail. See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). a poor example of the sense of progress, personal empowerment and the pursuit of happiness suggested by Maine's characterization of the contractual stage of history.
We know this from several documents he left behind, mostly letters, both official and personal. A few years after moving to Leipzig on his new contract, Bach wrote a moving and pathetic letter to a friend and former classmate, Georg Erdmann, beseeching him to help secure a better position elsewhere. Bach writes: "I find the post is by no means so lucrative as it had been described to me." 14 There were plenty of other quarrels with the city council, over almost every aspect of his job: teaching (Bach resented his contractual duty to teach non-musical topics), the nature of his musical output (the pious council vehemently condemned any music it suspected of being "operatic,") internal issues regarding the administration of the school and the student body (including incredibly minute issues of student hierarchy and prerogatives), absences from the city to perform elsewhere or to inspect new organs, and of course money. 20 See Bach's detailed letters of complaint addressed to no less than the instance of last resort, King Augustus II ("The Strong") who, as Elector of Saxony, was Leipzig's political sovereign. NBR 119. 21 Bach never had enough competent singers at his disposal, and instrumentalists were a motley crew of Thomasschule alumni, amateurs and a few professionals. In August 23, 1730, he wrote a detailed report to the city council, providing a vivid look into the musical organization of the several choirs he oversaw and provided for the city's Hauptkirchen and bemoaning the wanting level of available talent (NBR151). "projectors" of obligation and their language typically enumerates the several 22 As mentioned above, Bach continually sought -and by 1733 finally obtaineda commission as a "royal composer" to the elector of Saxony (who, in his person, was also king of Poland). That had some political and professional significance, yet did not substitute for his contractual job. 23 NBR 100. In a few places my translation varies slightly from the NBR's, with no great consequence. E.g.: "Schülern" (Art. 8) simply means "students," not "scholars;" "Hochweiser" in the preamble is better rendered as "noble and most wise" rather than "honorable etc.;" "Behutsamkeit" (Art. 9) is better captured here by "gentleness" rather than by "caution," and "regierenden" (Art. 12) means "ruling" or "reigning" or even "presiding," but not "honorable." The original German text is included in Werner Neumann and Hans-Joachim Schulze, eds, Bach-Dokumente, vol 1, 177-8 (Leipzig and Kassel, 1963).
performances agreed upon by the parties. It is worthwhile therefore to devote some attention to a closer reading of a few sections of this document (the entire text holds a preamble, 14 clauses, a closing undertaking and Bach's signature). It included such reasonable undertakings as:
[S]et the boys a shining example of an honest, retiring manner of life, serve the School industriously, and instruct the boys conscientiously (Art. 1);
Bring the music in both the principal Churches of this town into good estate, to the best of my ability (Art. 2);
Provide the New Church with good students (Art. 8); And, So that the Churches may not have to be put to unnecessary expense, faithfully instruct the boys not only in vocal but also instrumental music (Art. 6).
Music can be notoriously unruly both in length and character, and the city council would have none of that:
In order to preserve the good order in the Churches, so arrange the music that it shall not last too long, and shall be of such nature as not to make an operatic impression, but rather incite the listeners to devotion (Art. 7).
For the modern reader, however, some of the most striking clauses regard Bach's relationship with his employers and freedom of movement and trade:
Not to go out of town without permission of the ruling Burgomaster currently in office (Art. 12); Show to the Noble and Most Wise Council all proper respect and obedience, and protect and further everywhere as best I may its honor and reputation; likewise, if a gentleman of the Council desires the boys for a musical occasion unhesitatingly provide him with same, but otherwise never permit them to go out of town to funerals or weddings without previous knowledge and consent of the ruling Burgomaster and Honorable Directors of the School currently in office (Art. 3);
Render due obedience to the Inspectors and Directors of the School in each and every instruction which the same shall issue in the name of the Noble and Most Wise Council (Art. 4);
[S]hall not accept or wish to accept any office in the University without the consent of the Noble and Most Wise Council (Art. 14).
As far as could be determined, this fascinating document was never analyzed from a legal-historical perspective. Biographers of Bach frequently allude to it when describing the "passage to Leipzig" (although very rarely quote or present the text itself), probing it for signs of Bach's future unhappiness and the excessive demands made by the city council's on its director musices. But few treat it seriously as a legally binding, communicative instrument that is supposed to imagine and invent a relationship.
One thing that contracts are supposed to do is organize relations. This means setting out the parties' reciprocal obligations while incorporating them in relevant social and economic contexts. Tellingly, however, this document does not contain his authority within the Thomasschule, later to be challenged by rector and students alike (Arts. 1, 5, 6, 9, 10); even purely musical issues such as a ban on "operatic" music (Art. 7). The council, which obviously dictated the terms with little or no input from Bach, solidified in writing those hierarchical relations it was most concerned with. Bach breached the contract both occasionally and systematically, especially regarding absences from town, militating for a university position (which he reasonably considered his traditional due), sending choirs abroad for various assignments and neglecting his academic duties in the school, some of which he was allowed to outsource (especially the teaching of Latin). It seems he had good cause to complain about a similar treatment by the city council, but their defaults -failure to support his authority, to make provisions for adequately musically trained candidates for the school, to allow him, in good faith, to supplement his modest income, etc. -were not backed up by writing, not part of the text. Bach made frequent claims to the council, yet he could not rely on a textual source of obligation, as the council could when making its claims against him. He was left instead to invoke oral understandings that were not part of the textual contract, as well as institutional traditions and customs, i.e. fall back on status. The shift to contract was far from comprehensive.
There is an important sense of the contractual here, however, that transcends the specific historical setting. Bach's case vindicates the theoretical approach known as "relational contract theory." 24 According to relationalists, contracts are more comprehensive and diverse practices than can be captured by a discrete set of overt provisions, whether written or not. 25 income promised or legitimately expected never came his way. In contractual terms, the former justifies rescission of the contract, the latter -assuming this underperformance amounts to fundamental breach -terminating it. Both would constitute a legal basis for severing Bach's contractual relations with his employers.
What is especially significant in this letter is that Bach does something entirely different than merely asking for a favor from a well-positioned friend (or so he hoped, as nothing came out of it). The language he employs is that of justification: he justifies his resolve to leave his position by enumerating the city's failures to perform comparative review of the parameters of "classical" exclusionary formalism and inclusive relationalism (the theoretical basis for the abbreviated analysis offered above) see Jonathan Yovel, 48 AMERICAN BUSINESS LJ 371 at 371-380 (2011 to an ambition to improve his condition in spite of a constraining contract, but as an almost unavoidable-and justified-consequence of the city's breach.
In order to support the claim that Bach was in fact making legal or at least proto-legal claims rather than merely complaining, I want to place the structure of argumentation he employs in the context of the prevailing contemporary legal theory of contract, contract's ius communes as it were, as well as in its contemporary popularization through a new generation of celebrity legal authors such as Grotius, Pupendorf and Barbeyrac. This is interesting, for Bach's movement "from status to contract" coincided with the beginning of a period of legal transition, at least on the level of the legal discourse if not quite yet in actual practice. This was a period that saw the beginning of a disconnect between moral and legal theory, and a nascent withdrawing from the Natural Law tradition that traced its roots to Aristotle and Aquinas. This disconnect was, of course, especially sharp in England, finding its roots in Hobbes and culminating with Bentham, John Austin, and the rise of liberalism and its justificatory model of social contract. 30 The tradition more relevant for Bach's case, however, was that of the contemporary civil lawyers of Germany, France and the Low Countries, who, with all their originality, still used Roman law as an ideal jurisprudential model. We are then in times of transition and overlap between late scholasticism and early modernity. In surveying the relevant law, we keep in mind Bach's complaint: he was misled; reality didn't turn out as promised.
What are the normative bases and implications of these claims and how are they formed qua claims?
In contrast to later, will-based theories of contract whose normative nexus was the legislating autonomy of the communicating individual (a little on that below), scholastic contract law, in the early 18 th century still predominantly a product of the 30 See Atiyah, supra note 11. Working in Bentham's shadow and lacking the latter's rhetorical prowess, Austin is sometimes neglected as a radical precursor of legal positivism. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (London: John Murray, 1832). Natural Law tradition, did not regard promise as binding merely because it was given or given in exchange. Using the Aristotelian terminology of "causes," contract must be justified in terms of its causa: it justificatory rational. A Roman text oft quoted by the late scholastics warns that "When there is no causa, it is accepted that no obligation can be constituted by an agreement; therefore a naked agreement does not give rise to an action." 31 Causa, however, transcended Roman law: it became a general moral principle for the recognition and enforcement of contractual promises.
Working from the Aristotelian framework as synthesized with Roman law, such leading medieval jurists as Baldus de Ubaldis and Bartolus de Saxoferrato recognized different categories of causa, one based on liberality and generosity, another on commutative justice. 32 The first is irrelevant to our case. The second means that contract is binding only under conditions of equitable exchange. The basic principle is to avoid unjust enrichment by a party benefiting from an uneven exchange. 33 Bach certainly thought his services rendered for much less than was equitable and, additionally, expected. Scholastic law followed Aquinas' assertion that, as the normativity of a promise binds the promisor only under the circumstances in which he intended to be committed, mistake or misrepresentation at the time of formation (as distinct from ex post breach of contract), retroactively render the act of contracting involuntary. 34 Aquinas dealt in similar terms with excuse from performance where the circumstances have changed significantly: unforeseeable circumstances that were not within the scope of expectance of the promisor render the obligation nonbinding, inasmuch as the promisor cannot be held to have 31 If I invoked "inalienable" above, it is because sophisticated contractual regimes impose obligations on parties that restrict the practical significance of bargaining power discrepancies. This means that as a matter of social principle-stronger than mere instrumental policy-society requires people to deal within some boundaries of regulated behavior: it is not so much that assent needs regulation, as competition does (and every negotiation is also a competition). Modern contract law accepts as a truism that if parties are to contract through the state's license, backed by its sword, they are to accept the kind of minimum level of moral treatment of others that the state sanctions in "private" interactions. By contrast, "contractual Bach" appeared in a society that spoke contract but where contractual agency did not entail much more than the authority to acquiesce to the dictations of the party in the stronger bargaining position.
On the flip side, Bach's contractual freedom also helped shape his later activities, both musically and biographically. For a salient difference between status and contract is in terms of their comprehensiveness and the fragmentation of social roles and career. Being an employee of the city, Bach was free to engage in other activities and form various contractual relations over the years, as long as they did not run afoul of his chief employment relation. A servant needs his master's accord; a contractual party is free beyond the limits of the contract. It so happened that Bach was of an entrepreneurial spirit, constantly expanding his extracurricular musical engagements as well as business concerns. He frequently travelled to give keyboard performances -harpsichord and organ -in bigger cities; he gave private lessons to sons of wealthy aristocrats (but had specially reduced fees for talented students of meager means); he examined and was consulted on the building of organs all over Germany; he lent instruments for a small fee and owned a small shop for sheet music and musical books. 44 Bach loved musical instruments and engaged in designing some and amending others, most notably the Silbermann fortepiano, for which at It is unprofitable to debate whether his association with the Collegium Musicum generated these musicological shifts or the other way around; what is clear is that Bach's nexus of operation always corresponded intimately with the nature of his compositional work -both when he concentrated on religious music and later, when he didn't.
As much as Bach was, assuredly, self-driven, one cannot disregard the opportunities that his contractual position accorded him to freelance, in and out of 45 CHARLES S. TERRY, BACH: THE HISTORICAL APPROACH 83 (Oxford University Press, 1930). Reviewing reports from contemporary visitors, Terry concludes that "we can be sure he never heard his cantatas rendered with even approximate excellence." Ibid at 93. the city, marching his choirs to the country for some overtime any chance he got. 46 Later, set in his ways, he took time off to travel, perform elsewhere and inspect organs -activities that were essential to him but in fact violated a clause in his contract that required him to secure the Burgomeister's permission to travel (Art. 12). Bach didn't bother. He was always disdainful of the contractual limitations on his freedom of movement and occupation. Even when his health was failing he enjoyed professional journeys to aristocratic courts as well as to musically ambitious urban centers such as Dresden and Berlin.
47 None of this would have been possible (at least not in the form of relatively unencumbered freedom of action) had he remained a feudal retainer. The city council's enmity pestered him and effected his happiness and his income but, as long as it didn't fire him (a contingency that is noted in his contract), the council could do little, beyond humiliating reprimands, to restrict his movement or professional engagements. No Jail for Bach this time
around.
An obvious question would be whether Bach's hesitant legal move into fledgling modernity had any effect on his music, and of what kind. As tempting as the question appears, it is almost impossible to answer; even speculations are precarious. So much happened to Bach during those years, his sojourn in Leipzig was so long, formed and informed by a diversity of factors, forces and encounters, that absent direct evidence from him (and even with it), isolating one or a group of causal factors as musically significant would be wildly speculative. What is certain, is that the city created opportunities and encounters; and the city meant contract.
This essay, of course, is not about Bach musicology: it is about the partially overlapping stories of Bach and of contract. The overlap concerns the legal relations between the creative, entrepreneurial artist and the community he joined and resented; the tensions, ironies and contradictions-but also usefulness-of contract as a way to tell and reinterpret movement along the proverbial "status to contract" narrative of modernity; what Bach found there, and how this may serve as both a 46 A typical reprimand by the city council for such actions appears in excerpts from minutes of a council meeting, NBR 150.
47 However, Bach never journeyed out of Germany and, it seems, has never been further than 200 miles away from his birthplace in Eisenbach, Thuringia. (5) Not to take any boys into the School who have not already laid a foundation in music, or are not at least suited to being instructed therein, nor do the same without the previous knowledge and consent of the Honorable Inspectors and Directors; (6) So that the Churches may not have to be put to unnecessary expense, faithfully instruct the boys not only in vocal but also instrumental music; (7) In order to preserve the good order in the Churches, so arrange the music that it shall not last too long, and shall be of such nature as not to make an operatic impression, but rather incite the listeners to devotion; (8) Provide the New Church with good scholars; (9) Treat the boys in a friendly manner and with caution, but, in case they do not wish to obey, chastise them with moderation, or report them to the proper place; (10) Faithfully attend to the instruction in the School and whatever else it befits me to do; (11) And if I cannot undertake this myself, arrange that it be done by some other capable person without expense to the Honorable and Most Wise Council of the School; 48 The text that follows brings the NBR translation verbatim; however, see surpa, note 23.
